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INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The principle of comity,' although less well-known and un-
derstood than the related concept of full faith and credit,2 plays
a vital role in the field of international law. In the United
States, comity is an established principle that essentially regu-
lates the validity and enforcement of the judgments of foreign
nation courts in U.S. courts. Recently, Florida's Third District
Court of Appeal issued a ruling that greatly impacts the effect of
comity in Florida courts. The ramifications of this decision will
be felt in the private sector, Florida's banking industry, and
throughout the Florida economy as a whole.
II. FACTS
On May 15, 1984, Roebi Nahar, a citizen of Surinam,'
passed away in Miami, Florida. He left behind his second wife
Glenda, their three minor children, his six adult children by a
previous marriage, an aggregate sum of $657,000 deposited in
six Florida bank accounts, and certain other assets located on
the island of Aruba.' Three of the bank accounts were joint ac-
counts with right of survivorship between Roebi and Glenda; two
were trust accounts established for the minor children, with
Roebi and Glenda named as joint trustees; the last was a Totten
trust account5 opened by Roebi for Glenda and the minor chil-
dren, naming Roebi as trustee.' Soon after Roebi's death,
Glenda emptied all but the Totten trust and took control of the
1. Comity is defined, in general, as a willingness on the part of the courts of
one state or jurisdiction to give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state
or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual re-
spect. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 139 (5th abr. ed. 1983).
2. "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, re-
cords, and judicial proceedings of every other state ... ." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
3. Surinam, a nation located in the northeastern corner of South America, was
at one time a possession of The Netherlands and became independent in 1976.
4. Nahar v. Nahar, 656 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Aruba, an
island in The Netherlands Antilles, is a dependency of The Netherlands and is thus
subject to the laws of The Netherlands.
5. A Totten trust is a revocable trust created at the opening of a bank ac-
count and used to pass property outside of the probate process upon the death of
the depositor. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1513 (6th ed. 1990). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 104-107.




The decedent's adult children, residents of Aruba, petitioned
the Aruban Court of First Instance to administer the disposition
of the Florida bank accounts according to the law of The Nether-
lands.8 They argued that Roebi was domiciled in Aruba and that
he was only a temporary resident of Florida.9 Importantly, the
Aruban court obtained personal jurisdiction over Glenda when
she appeared in Aruba to contest the action.1" The Aruban pro-
ceeding, later affirmed by the Court of Cassation of The Nether-
lands," determined that the decedent was a domiciliary of
Aruba and ordered his estate administered under Dutch law.'2
The court issued an order commanding Glenda to transfer the
funds to Aruba. 3
The adult children then filed an ancillary administration in
Florida requesting that the Florida court order a transfer of the
proceeds of the bank accounts to Aruba, under the premise that
the court had authority to enforce the Aruban court order via
the principle of comity."' Glenda Nahar, acting individually and
as guardian of her minor children, filed a petition seeking revo-
cation of probate, asserting that the bank accounts had passed
to her and to her children by operation of Florida law. 5 Both
sides moved for summary judgment. 6
The Florida trial court found the issue res judicata, entered
summary judgment for the adult children, and ordered the bank
holding the proceeds of the original accounts to transfer them to
Aruba for probate. 7 Glenda Nahar appealed. 8 The Court of
Appeal for the Third District of Florida affirmed in large part
the trial court's ruling. It found that the trial court was correct
in enforcing the Aruban decree because a foreign order should be




11. The Netherlands Court of Cassation, more commonly known as "The
Hague," is the highest court of The Netherlands and its territorial possessions.
12. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 227.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 227-28.





extended comity where the parties have been given notice and
an opportunity to be heard, the foreign court has original juris-
diction, and the order does not offend the public policy of the
State of Florida."
The Third District's opinion in Nahar significantly trans-
formed Florida's approach to comity. In so doing, the Nahar
court failed to apply a controlling Florida statute and ignored
Florida case law and its own carefully crafted precedent. The
decision has serious ramifications for future cases involving
parties who seek to enforce the judgments of foreign country
courts.
This Note examines and criticizes the Nahar decision and
its treatment of the involved issues. Part III explores the use of
comity in Florida. Part IV discusses the decision's majority rea-
soning and the rationales underlying the vociferous dissents.
Part V analyzes the decision and its consequences for the future
of suits involving comity.
III. COMITY IN FLORIDA
In the interest of promoting international judicial reciprocity
and discouraging repeat litigation, U.S. courts have long used
the principle of comity to enforce the judgments of foreign na-
tions in the United States."0 The application of comity basically
entails that courts of one jurisdiction will give effect to judicial
decisions of another jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation
but out of deference and mutual respect.'
19. Id. at 229.
20. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 cmt. b (1971) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. See generally R.
Doak Bishop & Susan Burnette, United States Practice Concerning the Recognition of
Foreign Judgments, 16 INT'L LAW. 425, 427 (1982). The U.S. Supreme Court has
consistently held that the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit clause does not re-
quire United States courts to recognize and enforce the judgments of the courts of
foreign nations. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912). See also
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
For a further discussion of comity in U.S. courts, see William H. White, Jr.,
Note, Foreign Law, Politics & Litigants in U.S. Courts: A Discussion of Issues Raised
by Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S-A v. de Brenes, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
161, 182 (1995).
21. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64.
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Extensions of comity, however, are not without limitation.
Courts have refused to extend comity when there is a lack of
personal or subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant;22 the
order is based on fraud;23 there is a lack of notice to the
defendant;24 the order is not final;2" or the order is contrary to
the public policy of the forum where the party seeks enforce-
ment.26
Like most states, Florida has employed the doctrine of comi-
ty on a. limited basis to recognize and enforce foreign nation
judgments.27 Initially, Florida courts extended comity only to
final judgments and not to interlocutory28 orders.29 The policy
underlying this limitation was that "it would be an undue bur-
den for American courts to become entangled in
the ... intricacies of foreign court practice by recognizing or
enforcing the temporary court orders of another country."0
Florida courts have preferred to wait until a foreign court issued
a final order before deciding on the applicability of comity."' In
this respect, Florida law has been in accord with the practices of
most United States jurisdictions.1
2
22. RESTATEMENT § 104.
23. Id. § 98 cmt. g; § 115.
24. Parker v. Parker, 21 So. 2d 141, 142 (Fla. 1945); Montaner v. Big Show
Productions, 620 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal.
App. 3d 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Hager v. Hager, 274 N.E.2d 157 (IlM. App. Ct.
1971). See also Bishop & Burnette, supra note 20, at 437.
25. Ogden v. Ogden, 33 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1947). See also RESTATEMENT § 107.
26. RESTATEMENT § 98 cmt. g; § 117 cmt. c.
27. See Beverly Beach Properties, Inc. v. Nelson, 68 So. 2d 604, 609 (Fla.
1953); Willson v. Willson, 55 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1951); Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d
464, 469 (Fla. 1950); Ogden v. Ogden, 33 So. 2d 870 (1947). Following the U.S.
Supreme Court's reasoning in Aetna Life, 223 U.S. at 185, the Florida Supreme
Court has held that the Full Faith and Credit clause of the United States Consti-
tution does not require Florida courts to enforce the judgments of foreign nations.
Parker, 21 So. 2d at 142; Pawley, 46 So. 2d at 468. See also U.S. CONsT. art IV, §
1.
28. An interlocutory order is one that decides some preliminary point or matter,
but is not a final decision on the entire controversy. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 417
(5th abr. ed. 1983).
29. Ogden, 33 So. 2d at 874. See also RESTATEMENT § 107. See generally
George A. Zaphiriou, Transnational Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments,
53 NOTRE DAME LAw. 734, 747 (1978).
30. Cardenas v. Soils, 570 So. 2d 996, 998 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
31. Id.
32. Bishop & Burnette, supra note 20, at 430-31; Zaphiriou, supra note 29, at
747; RESTATEMENT § 107.
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Over the past decade Florida's Third District Court of Ap-
peal has gradually expanded the categories of foreign orders to
which it will extend comity. This movement began in 1984 when
the Third District granted comity to a temporary injunction
issued in St. Vincent and the Grenadines.33 The trend took on
greater shape in 1990 when the court rejected a per se rule
against recognition of interim foreign orders and instituted a
case-by-case analysis.' The court specifically included those
cases involving domestic relations support payments and protec-
tion of the rights of creditors as categories where public policy
strongly encouraged extension of comity to non-final foreign
orders.3" In 1991, the Third District extended comity to a tem-
porary injunction issued by an English court in a receivership
action.36 In its most recent ruling on comity prior to Nahar, the
Third District advanced the view expressed in Cardenas that
comity may be extended to interlocutory orders under certain
circumstances. 7 The court has failed, however, to set strict
guidelines delineating those situations where non-final judg-
ments of foreign nations will be extended comity.
IV. NAHAR v. NAHAR
A. The Majority Decision
In June 1995, the Third District Court of Appeal, sitting en
banc, held that a Dade County probate judge was correct in
enforcing the decree of an Aruban court and ordering the pro-
ceeds of the bank account transferred to Aruba.3" In reaching
that conclusion, the court found a Florida statute concerning
choice of law and bank accounts inapplicable. 9 The court then
33. Belle Island Inv. Co. v. Feingold, 453 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1984), cause dismissed, 459 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1984).
34. Cardenas v. Solis, 570 So. 2d at 999. See infra text accompanying notes 38-
42.
35. Cardenas, 570 So. 2d at 998.
36. Metropolitan Inv. Corp. v. Buchler, 575 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
37. Pacanins v. Pacanins, 650 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). See in-
fra text accompanying notes 77-79.
38. Nahar v. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 229.
39. Id. at 228, n.8. The court clearly erred by failing to apply Florida statute §
655.55. If the court had properly interpreted the requirements of the statute and
applied it in this case, it never would have reached the comity issue, and Florida
law would have controlled the disposition of the bank accounts. See infra text ac-
208 [Vol. 27:1
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changed the test for determining when a foreign nation's inter-
locutory order would be extended comity.4 °
The court acknowledged that originally only the final judg-
ments of foreign courts were entitled to comity, but proceeded to
trace the recent expansion of comity in the Third District."' It
then stated that the case-by-case rule announced in Cardenas
would be discarded in favor of the approach contained in the
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws." Virtually all foreign
decrees, final or interlocutory, would be extended comity as long
as they met requirements of notice and jurisdiction, and did not
conflict with the public policy of Florida.' The court concluded
that the Aruban court had met the requirements of the Restate-
ment, and therefore its order was entitled to comity in Florida.
The court did note that comity would not extend to Aruba's
order concerning the Totten trust account as it was not at issue
in the Aruban action and, under the rules governing Totten
trusts, had vested at Roebi's death in Glenda and the minor
children, the beneficiaries of the account."
companying notes 53-68.
40. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 229.
41. Id. at 228.
42. Id. at 228-29. As noted in Nahar, the Restatement's doctrine of recognition
of the judgments of foreign courts is contained primarily in §§ 98 and 92. Those sec-
tions read in pertinent part:
§ 98
A valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a
contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States so far as the
immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned.
Comment:
a. The rule of the Section is limited to valid judgments, that is,
to judgments which meet the requirements of section 92.
§ 92
A judgment is valid if
(a) the state in which it is rendered has jurisdiction to act judi-
cially in the case; and
(b) a reasonable method of notification is employed and a reason-
able opportunity to be heard is afforded to persons affected; and
(c) the judgment is rendered by a competent court; and
(d) there is compliance with such requirements of the state of
rendition as are necessary for the valid exercise of power by the
court.
Id.
43. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 229.
44. Id. at 230. The court failed, however, to note that the other accounts at
issue had vested simultaneously with the Totten trust. See infra text accompanying
notes 97-103.
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Finally, in two minor yet related holdings, the court ruled
that the trial court erred in failing to determine the disposition
of Roebi's Miami real estate45 but was correct in deducting the
costs of the action to recover the contents of the bank accounts
from the proceeds of the accounts.'
B. The Dissents
Writing for the three concurring/dissenting justices, Judge
Hubbart agreed with the majority's rulings concerning the Tot-
ten trust, the decedent's real estate, and the charging of the
costs of the action, but strongly disagreed with the rulings re-
garding the remaining five bank accounts. Judge Hubbart main-
tained that the use of comity was inappropriate in this instance,
because of the controlling Florida conflict-of-laws rule governing
joint bank accounts and Totten trusts.47 Without the principle
of comity available, Judge Hubbart noted that Florida law con-
trolled the disposition of these bank accounts and that under
Florida law the account proceeds passed to Glenda and her mi-
nor children.' He also disagreed with the majority's expansion
of the use of comity49 and its failure to apply Florida Statute
Section 655.55.5o
In a separate dissent, Judge Jorgenson added that the pub-
lic policy considerations involved in this case overrode the
court's power to extend comity because individuals who open
Florida accounts should be protected under Florida law from
intrusions by foreign courts.51 Judge Jorgenson argued that this
situation should be an exception to the application of comity.
5 2
45. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 225.
46. Id
47. Id. at 231.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 236 n.5 (Hubbart, J., dissenting). Judge Hubbart stated that the new
comity doctrine embraced by the majority was both an inappropriate extension of the
Third District's precedents and based on a misreading of the Restatement.
50. Id. at 234 n.3 (Hubbart, J., dissenting). Judge Hubbart disagreed with the
majority's reading of the statute's retroactivity clause as well as the clauses provid-
ing exceptions to the statute's application.
51. Id. at 239 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
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V. ANALYSIS
Nahar is a significant departure from Florida's use of comi-
ty, but the court should never have addressed the issue. Having
done so, however, Nahar represents a bold extension of comity,
and its results are, at best, problematic. The court's decision to
disregard precedent and create a new standard for the extension
of comity is questionable. Even assuming the validity of the new
approach, the Nahar court failed to apply important elements of
the newly-created standard.
A. Comity Should Never Have Been At Issue
The Nahar court reached the comity issue only because of
its failure to apply the controlling Florida statute." Had the
court applied the statute, disposition of the bank accounts would
have followed according to Florida law and the result would
have been completely different.'
In this respect, the court's first error was to misapply the
statute's retroactivity clause. The court held that the statute did
53. Florida Statute § 655.55 reads in pertinent part:
(1) The law of this state, excluding its law regarding comity and conflict
of laws, governs all aspects . .. of any deposit account in a branch or
office in this state of a deposit or lending institution . . . regardless of
the citizenship, residence, location, or domicile of any other party to the
contract or agreement governing such deposit account, and regardless of
any provision of any law of the jurisdiction of the residence, location, or
domicile of such other party, whether or not such deposit account bears
any other relation to this state ....
(3) As used in this section, the term:
(a) "Deposit or lending institution" means any of the following:
(1) A bank trust company, credit union, or association organized and
existing under the laws of this or any other state.
(b) "Deposit account" means any deposit or account in one or more names
including, without limitation, any . . . joint account ... trust account,
custodial account, fiduciary account, deposit in trust, or Totten trust
account ....
(6) This section applies to deposit accounts . . . entered into before, on,
or after July 1, 1988. However, this section does not apply to any deposit
accounts existing on July 1, 1988, if either party to the contract or
agreement governing the deposit account provides the other party with a
written objection to the application of this section within 6 months of
July 1, 1988.
Id.
54. For a discussion of the disposition of the accounts under Florida law, see
infra text accompanying notes 93-107.
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not apply to bank accounts opened and closed before July 1,
1988, the statute's effective date. The statute, however, clearly
provides that it is to apply to all accounts "entered into before,
on, or after July 1, 1988."ss No exception is made for accounts
closed before that date. The court further stated that the statute
was not applicable since Roebi Nahar died four years before the
effective date; 6 this despite the lack of any statutory provision
for such contingencies. 7 This interpretation is in clear defiance
of the express statutory command.
When the Florida Legislature enacted Section 655.55, it
merely codified, and did not change, Florida's common law. The
Legislature was thus within its constitutional authority when it
chose to make the statute apply retroactively to all bank ac-
counts. Indeed, the Third District Court of Appeal, per Judge
Hubbart in Sanchez v. Sanchez de Davila"5 ruled the retroactiv-
ity clause valid precisely because it did not alter but merely
codified the common law. In Sanchez several Totten trust ac-
counts were opened in 1979 and then closed by the account ben-
eficiaries in 1983 after the depositor's death. 9 As in Nahar, the
accounts were both opened and closed before the Florida Legisla-
ture enacted Section 655.55. Nevertheless, the Sanchez court
ruled the statute applicable because of the retroactivity
clause."0 The court should have done the same in Nahar and
was clearly in error by neglecting to do so.
The court's second error involved the interpretation of the
exception contained in Section 655.55(6). The court decided that
even if the statute applied, the accounts in question qualified for
the exception and thus fell outside the statute's purview.1
55. Fla. Stat. § 655.55(6) (1988). In Nahar, Judge Hubbart notes that the stat-
ute clearly applies to all accounts opened before July 1, 1988, without exception for
accounts closed before that date. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 234 n.3 (Hubbart, J., dissent-
ing).
56. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 228 n.8.
57. Id. at 234 n.3 (Hubbart, J., dissenting). Judge Hubbart points out that
there is no provision in the statute that exempts an account because an account
depositor died before the statute's enactment. He notes that the statute is clear in
mandating application to all accounts opened before July 1, 1998, regardless of
whether any depositor was living or dead on that date. Id.
58. 547 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
59. Id. at 944.
60. Id. at 945 n.2.
61. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 228 n.8.
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The exception provides that "if either party to the contract
or agreement governing the deposit account provides the other
party with a written objection to the application of this section
within six months"62 of the statute's effective date, the statuto-
ry provisions shall not apply.' The court determined that
Roebi, through his successor, had provided such an objection by
being involved in litigation of the accounts on July 1, 1988.
The crucial error in this regard is that the statute expressly
provides that the exception only applies to accounts in existence
on July 1, 1988.65 The court failed to acknowledge this lan-
guage when contemplating the use of the exception. Because the
accounts, as the Nahar court itself admitted, were closed in
1984, it was impossible for them to qualify for the exception
contained in Section 655.55(6). Therefore, the court clearly erred
by even considering it in this case.
Going beyond this oversight, the court's conclusion that the
notice required to invoke the exception had been given is also
suspect. The court equated the existence of litigation with the
requirement of written notice and disregarded explicit statutory
language.' Section 655.55(6) expressly limits those individuals
entitled to object to the statute's application to "either party to
the contract or agreement governing the deposit account."67 The
Nahar court ignored this express legislative command and care-
lessly broadened the category of persons entitled to invoke the
exception.68 According to the court's interpretation, the words
"either party" may now encompass both agents and successors of
the parties.
B. Florida Precedent
Having sidestepped the controlling statute, the Nahar court
reached the comity issue. It then radically modified its own prior
approach to deciding which foreign nation orders will be extend-
62. Fla. Stat. § 655.55(6) (1988).
63. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 234 n.3 (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 225 n.8.
65. Id. at 234 n.3 (Hubbart, J., dissenting) ("[T]he entire exemption only applies
to accounts, unlike the instant case, which existed on July 1, 1988.").
66. Id. at 225 n.8.
67. Fla. Stat. § 655.55(6) (1988).
68. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 234 n.3 (Hubbart, J., dissenting) (The court's position
that litigation equals notice under the statute "is clearly wrong.").
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ed comity. As Judge Hubbart notes, this unrestrained extension
will require Florida courts to extend comity to virtually every
foreign decree so long as valid personal jurisdiction is obtained
by the foreign court. 9 The court thus expanded comity far be-
yond the boundaries previously established by Florida case law.
As previously noted, Florida courts have a strong interest in
setting limits on comity.71 When necessary, they have reluc-
tantly expanded its application, but have tread cautiously in so
doing.71 In contrast, the Nahar court ignored that prudent his-
tory and instituted a rule providing little guidance as to exactly
which foreign decrees warrant comity's deference.
When the Third District first began its expansion of comity
in Cardenas v. Solis 72 and other cases, it restricted itself to
very limited instances compelled by strong public policy consid-
erations.7 3 In Cardenas, the court extended comity to a tempo-
rary injunction issued in Guatemala as part of a divorce ac-
tion.74 The injunction prevented the husband from accessing
half of the funds in Florida bank accounts while the divorce
proceeded in Guatemala. 75 The court noted that two types of
foreign, non-final decrees should be extended comity on grounds
of public policy: (1) domestic relations suits involving support
payments to spouses and minor children; and (2) suits where
creditors seek to collect on a valid debt.7" Although the court
69. Id. at 236-37 n.5 (Hubbart, J., dissenting) (Florida courts will now be re-
quired to enforce "any . . . foreign court order which satisfies certain basic jurisdic-
tional. . . prerequisites.").
70. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
72. 570 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
73. Id. at 999.
74. Id. at 997.
75. In Cardenas, the court ruled that Fla. Stat. § 655.55(1) did not prevent the
application of the rules of comity to Florida bank accounts. This holding has no
bearing on Nahar, however, because of the type of bank accounts involved. In
Cardenas, the account was merely a checking account, and Florida law gives no
answer to the question of ultimate ownership. Florida law only provides a pre-
sumption of ownership in these types of accounts and the question of true ownership
is left to the courts. In Nahar, however, Florida law is conclusive about ownership
of the accounts in question and there is no issue for the courts to decide. Therefore,
in Nahar, the issue of ownership is decided before comity can even be considered. In
Cardenas, the court distinguished Sanchez v. Sanchez de Davila, 547 So. 2d 943
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989), on the same grounds.
76. Cardenas, 570 So. 2d at 999. The court found that there was "obviously a
strong public policy" involved in enforcing decrees in these types of cases because
.spouses and debtors abroad ought not to be able to walk away from their foreign
[Vol. 27:1214
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had introduced comity into the realm of non-final decrees, it
specifically explained which areas the expansion would reach.
Neither support payments nor valid debt collections were at
issue in Nahar.
In Pacanins v. Pacanins," the court reaffirmed the
Cardenas ruling on almost identical facts. In a domestic rela-
tions suit where a wife sought a half-interest in Florida funds,
comity was extended to a Venezuelan injunction.78 Quoting
Cardenas on the policy concerns indicating an extension of comi-
ty in such instances, the court noted that "[t]his is clearly the
type of situation where public policy would favor the enforce-
ment of a foreign interlocutory order."79
After Cardenas and Pacanins, it was clear that where public
policy reasons dictated, comity could be extended to the interloc-
utory orders of foreign courts. The court, however, had not as
clearly explained that all interlocutory orders might be extended
comity regardless of strong forum public policy concerns. A mere
five months later, the Nahar court disregarded public policy in
reaching its decision.
By concluding that Cardenas established the power to ex-
pand comity to its limits, the Nahar court hastily overstated
Cardenas without considering the consequences. What the
Nahar court set forth is a doctrine of comity based only on the
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, which has very few lim-
its and demolishes the careful, cautious approach the Third
District had previously taken in expanding comity's application.
Surely, the Cardenas court had not anticipated the expansive
methodology employed in Nahar.
The consequences of this expansion will be far-reaching.
Florida has now ceded a great deal of control over its citizens to
the courts of foreign nations. So long as foreign courts can ac-
quire the threshold standards of jurisdiction and notice, they
may issue orders, final or interlocutory, that will have sub-
stantial effect on the property and legal relationships of thou-
sands of Floridians. The Nahar court might have been more
court-imposed obligations by spiriting away their money or assets to the United
States." Id.
77. 650 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
78. Id. at 1028-29.
79. Id. at 1030.
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prudent, and certainly more protective of Florida citizens, than
to chart a future course through a non-binding volume such as
the Restatement."
Assuming, arguendo, that the Third District was correct in
implementing the Restatement requirements for comity, it nev-
ertheless failed to acknowledge that even the Restatement plac-
es limits on the doctrine. These limits should have prevented the
Nahar court from approving its new version of comity in this
case.
C. The Non-Final Exception
The Nahar court crafted a new test for extending comity
based exclusively on the Restatement (Second) Conflict of
Laws.s" Under this test, the only impediments are related to
jurisdiction, notice, and public policy. As Judge Hubbart indi-
cates, however, the court failed to note additional restrictions on
comity mandated by Restatement Section 92 and set forth in
subsequent sections of the Restatement. 2
Restatement Section 107 declares that judgments will not be
recognized or enforced if the judgment is not a final determina-
tion under the law of the state issuing the order."M Therefore,
even under the Restatement view of comity the modifiable judg-
ments of foreign courts should not be extended comity by a Flor-
ida jurisdiction. As declared by the Cardenas court, the policy
behind this rule is that courts should not transfer jurisdiction to
a foreign court which could later vacate or modify its original
80. While Florida courts have sought guidance from the Restatement in the
past, Continental Mortg. Inv. v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981), al-
lowing the Restatement - a national compilation of the state of the law that is not
necessarily attuned to the specific public policy issues facing individual states - to
dictate the law's parameters is somewhat akin to allowing the tail to wag the dog.
The Restatement should report on what the law is rather than act to set the law.
Even if consulted by the courts of a foreign state, a court must take into account
the specific situation faced by that state and adapt the rulings found in the Restate-
ment accordingly.
81. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 235-36.
82. Id. at 236 n.5 (Hubbart, J., dissenting). Judge Hubbart points out that Re-
statement § 92 cmt. c, upon which the majority relies heavily in setting its new
test, qualifies its broad approach to comity by noting that judgments are entitled to
comity "except as stated in §§ 103, 107-121."
83. RESTATEMENT § 107. See also Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 236 n.5 (Hubbart, J.,
dissenting); Ogden v. Ogden, 33 So. 2d at 870.
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order." This is precisely the type of order enforced in Nahar.
The Aruban order only requires the account proceeds to be
transferred to Aruba for the probate process.8" No final judg-
ment was made concerning how those proceeds should be divid-
ed under Dutch probate law.8 Once the funds are transferred
to Aruba, Florida courts will have no power to ensure that the
rights of Glenda and her minor children are protected. Had a
judgment in Aruba already been made as to the allocation of
funds, the Florida court could divide them and transfer only
those funds that would be distributed to Aruban heirs, thereby
retaining control over those funds to which Glenda and her
children are entitled. To transfer all of the funds based on an
interlocutory order subject to future modification is premature
and prohibited under the Restatement.
8 7
Consideration of the rights of Glenda and her children leads
to a second exception included in the Restatement - that of a
conflict with the public policy of the jurisdiction where enforce-
ment is sought.
D. The Public Policy Exception
While the Nahar court stated that contravening forum pub-
lic policy is a reason to refuse an extension of comity, it failed to
indicate the source or limits of this concept. The public policy
exception is fully discussed in the Restatement.
Restatement Section 117 declares that judgments should be
enforced in United States jurisdictions even if contrary to the
public policy of the enforcing jurisdiction.8 A comment to that
section, however, provides an exception to this rule for all for-
eign nation judgments. 9 Under that comment, courts are free
to refuse enforcement of foreign judgments if enforcement would
84. 570 So. 2d at 998.
85. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 236-37 (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 236. Aruba, a civil code nation, follows a probate process termed
forced heirship, under which Glenda and all nine of Roebi's children will share
equally. For a general discussion of this form of probate law, see Deborah A. Batts,
I Didn't Ask to Be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance and a Proposal for
Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1211-16 (1990).
87. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 236 (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
88. RESTATEMENT § 117.
89. Id. § 117 cmt. c.
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be contrary to the forum's public policy.90
Two public policy concerns arise in Nahar which caution
against extension of comity to the Aruban order. The first is the
strong interest of the forum in protecting widows and minor
children; the second is in protecting Florida financial depositors
and the banking industry itself.
After her husband's death, Glenda was left alone to care for
herself and her three minor children. Subsequently, the six
adult children from Roebi's prior marriage appeared and de-
manded that Glenda move all of the funds intended for her to
Aruba where a court could determine their distribution. Florida
certainly has an interest in protecting its residents in such situ-
ations from being deprived of their property. This alone should
have been a sufficient ground for denial of comity. Instead, the
Third District placed a resident widow and her three minor
children at the mercy of a foreign court.
Furthermore, as noted by Judge Jorgenson, Florida has an
interest in protecting Florida bank depositors, as well as the
banks themselves.9 While he was alive, Roebi Nahar was in
the best position to determine how his money should be allocat-
ed at his death. He did so by establishing the six bank accounts.
Upon his death, however, his adult children appeared, claiming
to represent his interests. Subsequently, they prevented their
deceased father's wishes from being carried out. If a decedent
has taken advantage of perfectly legal mechanisms under Flori-
da law to determine the disposition of his property,9" Florida's
public policy interest should not aid a foreign nation's courts in
defeating those mechanisms.
Finally, Florida has a strong interest in protecting its finan-
cial industry, the international nature of which is undoubted. If
foreign depositors cannot be assured that disposition of their
funds deposited in Florida financial institutions will proceed
90. Id.
91. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 239 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting) ("Individuals who
open ... accounts . . . in Florida should enjoy the certainty that the disposition of
their funds in those accounts will be governed by the laws of Florida, and not by
the vagaries of a distant tribunal."). Id.
92. Roebi Nahar had placed his funds in three different types of bank accounts,
all legal under Florida law. For a discussion of what ultimately would have hap-




according to their legitimate wishes, they will discontinue use of
those institutions. The effect of the Nahar decision is to implant
just such uncertainty and insecurity in the minds of foreign
depositors. This could prove disastrous for Florida's financial
industry.
Individually or collectively, these public policies should have
persuaded the Nahar court not to extend comity to the Aruban
court order. Had the Third District denied comity for any of the
three reasons noted above, the resolution of the case would, of
course, have been quite different.
E. Resolution of Nahar Under Florida Law
If comity had been unavailable in Nahar, only a pure con-
flicts of law question would have remained. Judge Hubbart pro-
vides a thorough discussion of how Florida case and statutory
law would resolve that conflict and dispose of the six bank ac-
counts.9 3
Hubbart first notes that in conflicts questions concerning
the disposition of bank accounts, Florida courts have consistent-
ly endorsed the situs rule: the law of the site of the bank ac-
count shall control.9 ' He then points out another Third District
ruling, in a case almost identical to Nahar, in which the court
ruled that the law of Florida applied to the disposition of a Flori-
da bank account regardless of the domicile of any party to the
account.95
93. Id at 237 (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 232-33 (Hubbart, J., dissenting) (citing Seng v. Corns, 58 So. 2d 686
(Fla. 1952); Lieberman v. Silverstein, 393 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
See also E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Conflict of Laws as to Disposition of and Rela-
tive Right to Bank Deposits in the Names of More Than One Person, 25 A.L.R. 2d
1240 (1952).
95. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 233 (Hubbart, J., dissenting) (citing and discussing
Sanchez v. Sanchez de Davila, 547 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989). In
Sanchez, a Venezuelan national opened two Totten trust accounts in Miami, both in
trust for two of his sons. Upon his death, twelve children who were not beneficiaries
of the trust opened probate proceedings in Venezuela. The children also filed ancil-
lary probate proceedings in Miami seeking control of the Totten trust proceeds. The
trial court held that Venezuelan law applied to the accounts but the Third District
reversed. In Nahar, the majority distinguished Sanchez on the basis that the
Nahar's had an antenuptial agreement, but the court fails to explain why that
agreement has any bearing on the issues.
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Judge Hubbart concludes that if the Nahar court had ap-
plied Florida law to the six bank accounts, the accounts would
have passed at Roebi's death either to Glenda or to her minor
children and none of the proceeds would have become part of
Roebi's probate estate."
1. Joint Bank Accounts
Three of the accounts at issue were held by Roebi and
Glenda as joint tenants. Judge Hubbart points out that under
Florida Statute Section 658.56,"7 accounts held in two or more
names are presumed to provide rights of survivorship upon the
death of one tenant.98 This presumption must be overcome by a
party challenging the account.9 Hubbart indicates that no evi-
dence was produced by Roebi's adult children to rebut that pre-
sumption."° Thus, immediately upon Roebi's death Glenda be-
came the sole owner of the contents of the accounts by operation
of law.'0 ' Consequently, none of the money became part of
Roebi Nahar's probate estate. The Aruban court, therefore, did
not have the power to order transfer of those funds to Aruba for
Roebi's probate.
2. Joint Trust Accounts
Two of the accounts at issue were trust accounts naming
Roebi and Glenda as co-trustees for their minor children. Judge
Hubbart correctly points out that since the accounts were in
trust for the children and one trustee was still alive, the trust
continued to exist after Roebi's death and the proceeds could not
become part of his estate."2 Hubbart further notes that under
Florida law when one co-trustee dies the other becomes the sole
trustee and has the power to revoke the trusts, 10 3 as Glenda
96. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 233 (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
97. Florida Statute § 658.56 was repealed in 1992. The substance of the statute
was simultaneously reenacted in Florida Statute § 655.79.
98. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 233 (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. See also In re Estate of Clement, 568 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
102. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 238 (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (citing Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1956)).
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did. At Roebi's death, therefore, none of the contents of the trust
accounts attached to Roebi's estate. Again, it was not within the
power of the Aruban court to issue an order concerning those
accounts.
3. Totten Trust Account
The Totten trust account named Roebi as trustee for Glenda
and their children.'" As Judge Hubbart demonstrates, under
Florida law the beneficiaries of a Totten trust are entitled to the
proceeds of the account upon the death of the depositor. 15
Once Roebi passed away, ownership of the account passed imme-
diately to Glenda and her three children."°
Indeed, with respect to this account, the Nahar court ruled
that the proceeds had vested in Glenda and her children and
that the trial court had erred in ruling that this account was to
be transferred to Aruba.'17
The Nahar court revealed an overall inconsistency in so
ruling. Although it recognized the instant vesting of the Totten
trust, the court failed to perceive the same vesting of the joint
bank accounts and the joint trust accounts, even though under
Florida law they vested at the same moment as the Totten trust.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Nahar court could have reached the correct result by
either of two methods: (1) by ruling that Florida Statute Section
655.55 applied in this case and that therefore the use of comity
was impermissible; or (2) by ruling the statute inapplicable,
rejecting the use of comity due to reasons of non-finality and
public policy, and determining the choice of law issue. The con-
clusion from either process is that under Florida law the pro-
ceeds of the six bank accounts passed to Glenda and her minor
children and none of the proceeds became part of Roebi Nahar's
probate estate. At this juncture, the court should have declined
104. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 227 n.4.
105. Id. at 237 (Hubbart, J., dissenting) (citing Seymour, 85 So. 2d 1297;
Sanchez, 547 So. 2d 963; In re Solnik's Estate, 401 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1981)).
106. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 237 (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 230.
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to enforce the Aruban decree and refused to order the transfer of
funds.
Instead the Third District completely transformed Florida
law with respect to comity. The court permitted a foreign
nation's court to exercise power it never had over the property of
a Florida resident. Following the court's ruling, Glenda Nahar
must transfer the contents of all six bank accounts to Aruba and
await the probate of Roebi's estate under Dutch law.' °8
The suggested effect of Nahar on all cases involving comity
is substantial. The Third District has greatly altered the legal
landscape in a state so heavily populated by multi-national citi-
zens. Given the number of Florida residents that are citizens of
foreign nations, the issue is sure to appear often in Florida
courts. When it does, what will be the consequences? Perhaps
the case will merely teach people like Glenda Nahar a simple
lesson: never appear in a foreign nation's court to contest a case.
By not appearing, she would have prevented the Aruban court
from satisfying one of the key components required by the
Nahar court, valid personal jurisdiction. But is that the best
solution? Is it desirable for parties to avoid the law because they
fear their own state courts will not enforce their property rights?
Unfortunately, after the decision in Nahar v. Nahar, that is
precisely the situation that exists today.
An alternative but equally reprehensible result is that for-
eign residents of Florida will avoid Florida courts in order to
protect their property and prevent what was done to Glenda
Nahar. Temporary Florida residents who are citizens of foreign
countries have lost the security they once had when depositing
funds in Florida financial institutions. At the depositor's death,
those funds may be disposed of in a manner never intended by
the decedent if family members in a foreign country can get to
court quickly and receive a favorable ruling compelling transfer
of the funds from Florida. The Nahar court stated that in such a
situation it will regard the foreign judgment as a conclusive
settlement of the issue and will enforce it regardless of Florida
law.
108. Dutch law includes provisions for "forced heirship" whereby a surviving
spouse takes in equal shares with all surviving children. Therefore, in this case the
likely outcome in Aruba is that Glenda and each of Roebi's nine children will receive
one-tenth of his estate.
222 [Vol. 27:1
COMITY IN FLORIDA
Consequently, foreigners will deposit their funds in other
American states - states that will guarantee, through legisla-
tive and judicial enforcement, the intended disposition of ac-
counts upon a depositor's death. Such a movement would harm
the Florida banking industry and the entire state economy.
In November 1995, the Supreme Court of Florida declined
review of the Third District's ruling in Nahar.'" Although dis-
appointing, this refusal was expected because all Florida law
concerning comity has been made by the Third District and thus
there is no conflict between this decision and any other Florida
court of appeal.10°
A suggestion was made in 1979 that the Florida legislature
follow the lead of many other states and codify the foreign judg-
ment issue."' No action has been taken on that suggestion,
and it is urged again here that this be considered since it would
be the most direct and effective manner of putting the issue to
rest. The legislature should take the opportunity to clarify the
rules governing comity and the enforcement of foreign judge-
ments. Thousands of Floridians and the entire Florida financial
industry are depending on it.
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